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INTRACTABLE SYRIA? INSIGHTS FROM 
THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON THE 
FAILURE OF MEDIATION 
J. Michael Greig* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its beginning in March 2011, the conflict in Syria has 
produced considerable human suffering and increased the risk of 
greater regional instability. The conflict has produced in excess of 
35,000 fatalities and displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians.1 
Violence against civilians has brought widespread condemnation 
from across the international community. This violence, in turn, has 
also increased calls for action to stop the fighting in Syria and protect 
its civilian population. 
To this end, a wide array of sanctions has been imposed upon 
the Syrian government by actors including the United States, 
members of the European Union, the Arab League, and regional 
powers such as Turkey. The United Nations Security Council has 
been sharply divided on how to deal with the crisis, with the United 
States, Great Britain, and France calling for tougher language and 
action against the Assad regime, and Russia and China in opposition. 
Despite this lack of unanimity on the Security Council, U.N. 
                                                 
* J. Michael Greig, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of 
North Texas. 
1 See CNN Staff, By the Numbers: Syria Deaths, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war-compare/index.ht 
ml; VDC: CENTER FOR DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA, 
http://www.vdc-sy.org/index.php/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
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Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed former U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan as U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Envoy on 
Syria in February 2012. Efforts to mediate the Syrian conflict are 
consistent with the broader tendency of mediation to be applied to 
the most difficult conflicts in the international system.2 Despite 
Annan’s presentation of a plan to end the conflict and the dispatch in 
April 2012 of a U.N. ceasefire monitoring mission, the Syrian conflict 
has proven difficult to manage. A lasting ceasefire has proven elusive 
among the belligerents, with conflict escalating sufficiently that 
activities by the U.N. monitoring mission were suspended in June 
2012 and its mandate went without renewal following its expiration. 
Deteriorating conditions in August 2012 and the refusal of the Syrian 
regime to negotiate led to the resignation of Kofi Annan, who was 
subsequently replaced as U.N. envoy to Syria by Lakhdar Brahimi. In 
his resignation, Annan laid blame for the failure of mediation at the 
feet of both external powers as well as the warring sides themselves 
stating, “without serious, purposeful and united international 
pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for 
me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place, 
and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a 
political process.”3 
The inability of the United Nations or any other third party to 
broker an end to the violence in Syria, despite early and frequent 
demands by an array of outside powers for a cease-fire and the 
dispatch of peace envoys and a U.N. monitoring force, raises the 
question of why the Syrian conflict has proven so impervious to 
settlement. Not only have third-party efforts to manage the conflict 
been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in 
Syria with the level of violence mounting on both sides and civilian 
suffering deepening. In this paper, I explore the ways in which some 
of the insights from the scholarly conflict management literature can 
be brought to bear in understanding the specific challenges faced by 
                                                 
2 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to 
Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013). 
3 Rick Gladstone, Annan Steps Down as Peace Envoy and Cites Barriers in Syria 
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third-party efforts to manage the Syrian conflict. I argue that the 
characteristics of the warring sides and the way in which fighting has 
evolved between the Syrian government and rebels each play an 
important role in the failure of conflict management. 
NUMBER OF PARTIES 
The number of parties involved in a conflict plays an 
important role in the prospects for successful mediation. In general, 
as the number of parties in a conflict grows, the chances for 
mediation success dim. Increasing the number of parties involved in 
conflict brings three problems for mediation. First, communications 
become tougher as the number of parties involved in a conflict 
increase.4 A mediator confronting a conflict involving several parties 
faces the difficult task of coordinating communications among each 
side while limiting the chances of miscommunications. Second, 
increasing the number of parties involved in a conflict raises the risk 
of spoilers for the peace process. Increasing the number of warring 
actors also increases the number of interests at stake among the 
parties, increasing the number of veto players5 and raising the risk 
that one or more parties oppose a settlement agreed to by the others. 
This can create spoilers who engage in violence to derail the peace 
process until their own demands are met.6 Third, increasing the 
number of players in a conflict also increases the possibility of 
commitment problems for any settlement. Peace efforts in civil wars 
are inherently susceptible to commitment problems in which, even if 
an agreement can be reached, the lack of enforcement makes neither 
side confident that the other will live up to the terms of the 
agreement.7 Commitment problems are exacerbated as the number of 
actors involved in a conflict grows because agreement monitoring 
becomes more difficult and the chances of spoilers increases. 
                                                 
4 See J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIATION 104-105 (2012).  
5 See David Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table? Veto Players and Peace 
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).  
6 See Desirée Nilsson, Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil 
War Settlements, 45 J. PEACE RES. 479, 481-82 (2008).  
7 See Barbara F. Walter, Bargaining Failures and Civil War, 12 AM. REV. 
POL. SCI. 243, 254 (2009).  
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In this respect, the Syrian conflict presents a difficult 
challenge for third parties seeking to mediate it. Because the rebels 
are divided among a large number of groups, each with different 
goals and backgrounds, it is difficult to simply identify all of the 
actors needed to participate in any potential peace process. Although 
the Free Syrian Army provides a unified name to much of the armed 
Syrian opposition, this unity is limited. The Free Syrian Army is, at 
best, a very loose collection of militia groups with minimal 
coordination among one another.8 Foreign supporters of the Syrian 
opposition have sought to encourage the development of a broad 
coalition group to bring the rebels under one political umbrella. The 
Syrian National Council was an early effort at unity, but it proved 
difficult to coordinate with the Free Syrian Army, and struggled with 
major divisions among constituent groups. The new National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is another 
effort to unify the Syrian rebels, but its prospects for success remain 
uncertain.9 
INTENSITY AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE 
Just as the characteristics of the warring sides shape the 
chances for effective mediation, a large body of scholarly literature 
points to the way in which a conflict unfolds over time as a key 
influence on the chances that diplomatic efforts will be fruitful.10 
While some civil conflicts at their outset may inherently be more or 
less susceptible to successful conflict management efforts, what takes 
place on the battlefield over the course of the conflict shapes the 
incentives for warring sides to accept mediation and make the 
                                                 
8
See Rania Abouzeid, Syria’s Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who are the Saudis 




See Jonathan Masters, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisis-
global-response/p28402.  
10 See, e.g., Dean Pruitt, Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks, 2 INT’L 
NEGOTIATIONS 237 (1997); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing 
Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals, 45 J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 691 (2001); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND 
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1989). 
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concessions for a settlement. As a result, some points in time during 
a conflict present better opportunities for effective third-party 
diplomacy than others. 
One of the challenges in managing a civil conflict is that as 
the level of violence among belligerents grows, it increases hostility 
among the parties, encouraging even more violence in the future.11 
This process, in turn, closes off communication between warring 
sides,12 increases the extent to which the parties see themselves as 
victims of the other,13 and encourages the belligerents to frame their 
goals in terms of punishing the other side.14 Put together, increasing 
levels of violence undermine the likelihood and effectiveness of 
mediation efforts in managing the conflict. 
The intensity of violence in Syria directly cuts against third-
party efforts to manage the conflict and locate a settlement. When 
mediation is applied to a civil war immediately following a spike in 
battle deaths, the chances that talks will produce an agreement among 
the combatants is sharply reduced.15 This is precisely the pattern that 
casualty levels in Syria have followed. From June 2012 to August 
2012, the number of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing 
from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in August.16 Rising casualty 
levels in Syria have made it harder for third-party efforts to manage 
the conflict. 
                                                 
11 See ZARTMAN, supra note 10, at 263. 
12 See Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson & Donette L. Wille, 
Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations, 28 J. PEACE RES. 7, 13 (1991); THOMAS PRINCEN, 
INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 54-59 (1992). 
13 See generally STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL 
WAR (Cambridge University Press 2006) (1964).   
14 See Dean Pruitt & Paul Olczak, Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving 
Seemingly Intractable Conflict, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS 
INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 59 (Barbara Bunker & Jeffrey 
Rubin eds., 1995).  
15 J. Michael Greig, Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement, 
and Openings for Mediation, paper presented at the 2012 Meeting of the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy Conflict Prevention Working Group, State College, PA, 2012.  
16 David Kenner, Syria Is More Violent Than Iraq at Its Worst, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:27AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09 
/10/syria_is_more_violent_than_iraq_at_its_worst.  
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Although rising casualty levels diminish the chances for 
mediated agreement, the conflict management literature points to 
another window for effective third-party diplomacy that is relevant to 
Syria. While warring sides build up animosity and become less willing 
to compromise the more they fight, at some point, as the two sides 
build up more conflict costs, belligerents begin to seek an alternative 
to fighting.17 As these costs grow for the belligerents, with neither 
able to overcome the other and suffering increasing for each, a 
hurting stalemate emerges.18 The development of this hurting 
stalemate during a conflict creates a second window of opportunity 
for mediation to end the fighting. Fundamental to the hurting 
stalemate is that both sides must feel unacceptably painful conflict 
costs and each must perceive that it cannot win the conflict and impose 
its own terms of settlement. When a hurting stalemate develops, civil 
war combatants become more open to mediation and grow more 
willing to make the concessions necessary for a settlement. 
What does this mean for Syria? Despite the deepening 
suffering among the Syrian populace and the worsening level of 
violence, there is little indication that Syria has developed sufficiently 
into a hurting stalemate that settlement is likely. Although the level of 
conflict is high, there is no evidence that it is unbearably so for either 
side. At the same time, there is also nothing to suggest that either side 
believes that it cannot ultimately prevail in the conflict and impose its 
own terms without negotiation. Civil war research suggests that the 
chances for mediation success only begin to approach the odds of 
success that exist early in a civil conflict after fighting has continued 
for 130 months and 33,000 battle-deaths have resulted, a level  well 
above where the Syrian conflict is.19 In this respect, Syria finds itself 
in a nether zone of conflict. The warring sides have fought long 
enough to become so hostile that there is little, if any, trust between 
them and dialogue among the belligerents has become virtually 
                                                 
17 See J. Michael Greig & Patrick Regan, When Do They Say Yes? An 
Analysis of the Willingness to Offer & Accept Mediation in Civil Wars, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 
759 (2008).  
18 See I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul C. 
Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).  
19 Greig, supra note 15.  
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impossible. At the same time, the history of conflict has yet to reach 
a sufficiently painful, stalemated point that the parties become open 
to a settlement. From the perspective of a mediator, Syria finds itself 
in the worst of all possible worlds. 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD 
Beyond the intensity and duration of violence, where fighting 
between rebel and government forces occurs also significantly 
impacts the success of mediation. This has direct implications for the 
conflict in Syria. One of the challenges that a rebel force challenging 
a government faces is demonstrating its ability to mount a credible, 
durable threat to the regime. If a government anticipates that the 
rebels can be quickly defeated or doubts the ability of the rebels to 
impose significant costs on the regime, there is little reason for the 
regime to negotiate with the rebels. To push governments to the 
bargaining table, rebels must demonstrate their ability to impose 
unacceptable costs on the regime. One way for rebels to do this is to 
mount a military threat to a country’s major cities. In doing so, rebels 
can disrupt important economic, social, and political activity for the 
country. This can increase pressure from the populace on the 
government to negotiate with the rebels. 
As Syrian rebels increased their ability to threaten the 
government across broader swaths of territory, their ability to impose 
costs on the government also increased. As protests spread from 
Dara’a to Homs and Aleppo, important industrial and financial 
centers, the Syrian government began to signal their willingness to 
make some limited concessions. At this point, however, these 
concessions were not sufficient to stop the violence from deepening 
and appeared more tactical than sincere. This points to a particular 
challenge faced in managing civil conflicts. Conditions that might 
encourage one side to offer concessions can encourage the other to 
resist settlement with the expectation of better terms from fighting 
than talking. As rebels see more success on the battlefield, they tend 
to increase their demands on the government during talks. When 
these increased demands are unacceptable for the regime, diplomatic 
efforts become more likely to fail. 
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The best example of this tendency for rising expectations of 
victory to influence mediation is the effect that civil war battles 
fought near the capital exert. Rather than increasing the likelihood of 
agreement, the closer civil war battles occur to the capital, the less 
likely mediation is to take place at all and, when it does occur, the less 
likely it is to be successful.20 These diminished prospects for 
mediation are a function of the distinct effects that such battles have 
on both rebels and governments. For rebels, as their ability to sustain 
a challenge near the capital grows, they increasingly see better 
prospects for victories. As a result, rebels tend to increase their 
demands on the regime in any settlement talks.21 A government 
facing rebels near the capital is likely to see continued fighting as 
preferable to agreement. First, such a government may see the 
potential demands from the rebels as likely to be unacceptable to the 
regime, potentially demanding terms such as the complete removal of 
government officials. Second, even a government interested in 
reaching a settlement may conclude that it can get better terms if it is 
able to push the rebels away from the capital. 
The way the dynamics of the Syrian conflict changed in July 
2012 as rebel attacks began on the capital is consistent with this line 
of thinking. The mounting violence in the capital not only imposed 
real costs on the Syrian regime, but also carried important 
psychological costs as well. Neil MacFarquhar argues that keeping 
violence away from Damascus had an important effect on the Syrian 
psyche, suggesting that protecting Damascus from threat “became a 
kind of a psychological yardstick: if Damascus remained under 
control, it meant the Assad government was still in control.”22 As 
these attacks on the capital mounted, rather than offering 
concessions or embracing diplomacy, the Assad regime adopted 
increasingly aggressive measures, using air strikes against rebel 
positions in Aleppo and Damascus and shelling Damascus 
neighborhoods where rebel forces were believed to be located. In this 
                                                 
20 See id.  
21 See Halvard Buhaug & Jan Ketil Rød, Local Determinants of African Civil 
Wars, 1970–2001, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 315 (2006).  
22 Neil MacFarquhar, Damascus Confronts New Reality After Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/ 
world/middleeast/bombing-attack-shifts-equation-in-syria-uprising.html?_r=0.  
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respect, Jeffrey White, former senior Middle East analyst for the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, argues that “There will not be any 
negotiations . . . . He [Assad] will go down fighting, and he will 
probably do it in Damascus.”23 
CONCLUSION 
The Syrian conflict has seen a variety of third-party efforts 
from individual states, the Arab League, and the United Nations to 
manage the conflict and find a settlement. Thus far, the conflict has 
proven intractable. Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
lament about the lack of purposive and unified action by the 
international community toward Syria explains some of this conflict 
management failure. Others have laid some of the blame at the feet 
of the decisions made by those who have attempted to mediate the 
conflict. Yet, what we know about conflict management points to 
characteristics of the Syrian conflict that make it inherently difficult 
to resolve diplomatically. The characteristics of the parties and how 
they have fought each shape the effectiveness of conflict 
management even before the mediators arrive. 
 
                                                 
23 Joby Warrick & Anne Gearan, For Syria’s Assad Only Exit May Be a Body 
Bag, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2012, at A01, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 2012-
07-31/world/35486777_1_syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-aleppo-troops-battle-
rebels.  
